Introduction
Fuel optimization has always been one of the main goals of the automotive industry. Diesel engines seem to be a convenient solution as they provide up to 30% more gas mileage compared to gasoline engines [1]. Yet, diesel engines that perform well often produce a high level of toxic emissions, violating the regulations of current environmental laws. Even though many companies, including Mazda, Honda, Nissan, and Hyundai, turned away from using diesel engines for automobiles, some chose to implement them and even attempted to avoid detection of the overwhelming emissions through illegal means [2]. The infamous German automaker, Volkswagen Group, developed a “defeat device” in diesel engines to cheat emissions tests in the United States for the past decade. This report aims to reveal the decisions made by the CEO, upper management, and engineers of Volkswagen, and to discuss the ethical implications regarding the topics of leadership, engineering practices, and environmental protection.
Findings
In May 2014, researchers at West Virginia University found that some cars manufactured by Volkswagen emitted up to 35 times the acceptable limit for nitrogen oxides during an on-road test [3]. Further investigations by the Environmental Protection Agency found that these vehicles were able to pass the emissions tests because of a “defeat device” within the main computer of the car. This device was a software system that was able to sense testing environments and activate equipment that could reduce toxic gas emissions [4]. In the end, Volkswagen admitted that over 11 million vehicles cheated the regulation tests [5]. This enormous scandal resulted from the decisions of many responsible parties.
Even though Volkswagen Group’s CEO did not contribute to the development of the cheating software, he was the main driving force of the scandal. As the newly appointed CEO in 2007, Martin Winterkorn set the goal for the company to defeat Toyota, the top automobile company at the time. To achieve this, Volkswagen had to sell at least 10 million cars in the coming year. Recognizing the advantages of the diesel engines, Winterkorn decided that the U.S. market was a perfect opportunity as only a few competitors were using this type of engines [6]. In order to promote conformity and maximize performance, Winterkorn pressured his workers and made sure that everything was going well as he had planned. According to one of the industry analysts at Volkswagen, “Before anyone reports to [Winterkorn], they make sure they have good news [6].” This made his employees work under the fear of failures and would take any measures that would lead to success.
Managers at Volkswagen were pressured with the task to introduce high-performance diesel engines to the United States with very little time. They realized that their diesel cars could never fulfill the strict emission standards if they were to keep the cars’ performance levels. At that time, a prototype of the “defeat device” created by Volkswagen Group’s subsidiary Audi caught the eyes of the supervisors. Even though engineers had clearly rejected the idea of implementing the software in the U.S., the managers ignored the warnings and further pursued the project. They instructed the engineers to refine the program and kept this component hidden by destroying all the related documents [7].
After their failed attempts to fight against the orders from the top, the engineers disregarded the laws by following through with the project. Given the dictatorial company culture, it was clear that the engineers were threatened with losing their jobs if they refused to do what they were told. On the other hand, they believed that no one would notice the few lines of cheating code within the huge software of the car. Bruce Ricker, a senior software engineer for Informatics Holdings in Plano, Texas, pointed out that vehicles may have over 50 different computers and contain millions of lines of code. He also claimed that the “defeat device” was probably universal to car-manufacturing and could be replicated easily [2]. This shows that engineers chose to proceed with the plan because the task was easy to accomplish, and they were confident that their work would not be exposed.
Ethical Implications
As the CEO of Volkswagen with an engineering background [8], Winterkorn had the responsibility to understand and follow the WFEO Code of Ethics. Rule 3.1 states that engineers as leaders should provide services as to improve the lives of the society [10]. However, not only did Winterkorn put the public in danger with the toxic gas emissions of the diesel engines, he used false claims, such as “Clean Diesel,” to promote Volkswagen’s products [9]. Although Winterkorn did not come up with the idea to cheat on the emission tests, he had the power and the option to disapprove it in order to protect the health of the public. Moreover, he also could have given more time to his employees to find a solution that would benefit the general public.
Volkswagen’s engineers chose to implement the “defeat device” even though they knew clearly that it was against the engineering codes. The WFEO Code of Ethics rule 2.2 asserts that engineers should follow all the rules and regulations in their works [10]. Nevertheless, they knew about the emission limits and developed the device solely not to abide by the laws. This is a criminal act that is strictly prohibited as stated in rule 1.1 [10]. These engineers could have dealt with the situation through other ethical ways. Once they were ordered to install such a system to the cars being manufactured in the U.S., they had the opportunity to report to the corresponding government officials. This aligns with the instructions of rule 2.5 of the Rules of Conduct of HKIE, in which all unethical acts should be brought to attention to the Institution [11]. Furthermore, engineers could convince the company of the benefits of open source code, so that they would maximize their transparency to the public. Rule 1.2 of the WFEO Code of Ethics demands engineers to be honest and without bias [10]. By being completely genuine, deceptions could not have formed and the laws would not be violated.
Apart from the scandal, the most important ethical issue of the engineers was their willful ignorance towards the harm that was brought to the world by their products. The health and safety of the public should be of the utmost priority to engineers. The WFEO Code of Ethics Rule 4 implies that engineers should be attentive to their project’s effects on the society and the environment [10]. The engineers at Volkswagen were aware of the severe damage their design of the diesel engines could do to the environment. They had the choice not to build such engines but other more environmentally friendly ones, which was feasible as shown by other competitive companies [2]. In addition, they could also modify their design by sacrificing some fuel optimization and car performance in order to match the U.S. emission limits. Conversely, they breached the code and indirectly created the enormous amount of pollution in the past decade.
Conclusion
To conclude, this report has shown that the scandal was a result of the decisions made by the leader and employees of Volkswagen. It also examined the ethical implications that follow from their actions. Winterkorn’s ambitions and leading style put immense pressure on his employees. In order to come up with a solution on time, managers and engineers constructed a cheating strategy and had the confidence to carry it out without getting caught. They disregarded the horrible impacts on the environment and tried their best to cover up their unethical plan. The engineers were dishonest to the public and harmed the environment purposefully, breaching multiple rules of the WFEO Code of Ethics.
References
[1] D. Sclar, "The Pros and Cons of Diesel Engines", dummies. [Online]. Available: http://www.dummies.com/home-garden/car-repair/diesel-engines/the-pros-and-cons-of-diesel-engines/.
[2] L. Goodman, "Why Volkswagen Cheated", Newsweek, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/25/why-volkswagen-cheated-404891.html.
[3] D. Morgan, "West Virginia engineer presented VW emissions findings a year ago", Automotive News, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.autonews.com/article/20150923/OEM11/150929933.
[4] R. Hotten, "Volkswagen: The scandal explained", BBC News, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772.
[5] V. Luckerson, "This Small Study Helped Expose Volkswagen's Deception", Time, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://time.com/4048115/volkswagen-golf-emissions-researchers/.
[6] L. Lynch and C. Santos, "VW Emissions and the 3 Factors That Drive Ethical Breakdown", Darden Ideas to Action, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://ideas.darden.virginia.edu/2016/10/vw-emissions-and-the-3-factors-that-drive-ethical-breakdown/.
[7] T. Leggett, "VW papers shed light on emissions scandal", BBC News, 2017. [Online]. Available: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-38603723.
[8]S. Mazumdaru, "VW diesel engineer Liang to be sentenced in the US", Deutsche Welle, 2017. [Online]. Available: http://www.dw.com/en/vw-diesel-engineer-liang-to-be-sentenced-in-the-us/a-40226054.
[9] "Volkswagen sued by US watchdog over false 'Clean Diesel' claims", the Guardian, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/mar/29/volkswagen-vw-sued-federal-trade-commission-clean-diesel-claims.
[10]"WFEO Model Code of Ethics", Wfeo.org, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.wfeo.org/wp-content/uploads/code_of_ethics/WFEO_MODEL_CODE_OF_ETHICS.pdf. [Accessed: 10- Mar- 2018].
[11]"Rules of Conduct", Hkie.org.hk, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.hkie.org.hk/cpd/icac/conduct.html. [Accessed: 10- Mar- 2018].
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